Money laundering is a criminal activity that refers to the process of concealing, converting, transferring, or disguising the proceeds of crime so that they appear to originate from legitimate sources. In Türkiye, the phenomenon of money laundering has acquired particular significance due to the country’s geopolitical position, its integration into regional and global trade routes, its dynamic tourism sector, and the continued presence of cash-intensive economic activities. These structural characteristics make Türkiye both a legitimate commercial hub and a jurisdiction vulnerable to the misuse of financial and non-financial systems by criminal actors seeking to launder illicit proceeds.

In practice, money laundering in Türkiye is closely connected to a wide spectrum of predicate offences, including corruption, fraud, organized crime, drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, cybercrime, and illegal betting and gambling activities. In many of these cases, laundering is not an auxiliary or incidental offence but the central mechanism through which criminal proceeds are preserved, transferred, and reintegrated into the lawful economy. Without effective laundering techniques, the economic incentives underlying serious crime would be substantially reduced. For this reason, Turkish criminal law treats money laundering as a serious offence in its own right and has progressively expanded both substantive and procedural tools to combat it.

The Turkish anti-money laundering framework has been heavily influenced by international developments since the late 1980s. International cooperation against money laundering initially emerged in response to drug-related crime and later expanded to address broader forms of organized crime and corruption. Türkiye’s accession to key United Nations conventions and its alignment with Financial Action Task Force standards have materially shaped the evolution of domestic legislation, institutional design, and enforcement priorities. Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the global AML regime underwent further expansion, with a heightened focus on terrorism financing and, later, on the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These developments prompted Türkiye to integrate counter-terrorism financing measures into its existing AML system, resulting in a more comprehensive regulatory and enforcement framework.

Today, Türkiye’s AML regime is characterized by a dense normative environment that combines criminal law provisions, administrative regulations, and supervisory mechanisms. Binding international treaties operate alongside soft-law instruments and technical standards, while domestic legislation translates these obligations into enforceable rules. However, as is increasingly recognized both domestically and internationally, the principal challenge facing Türkiye is no longer the absence of legal rules but the effective implementation of those rules in practice. High-quality risk assessments, consistent supervision, meaningful suspicious transaction reporting, and the operational capacity to trace, freeze, confiscate, and recover assets – particularly in cross-border cases – remain decisive factors in the effectiveness of the Turkish AML system.

The nature of money laundering in Türkiye

Money laundering is the attempt to render the proceeds of crime reusable by transforming their appearance, location, or ownership. Although laundering techniques vary considerably, the process is commonly conceptualized as consisting of three stages: placement, layering, and integration. In Türkiye, placement often involves the introduction of illicit funds into the financial system through cash deposits, cash-heavy businesses, informal money transfer mechanisms, or the purchase of easily transferable assets. Layering typically entails a series of transactions designed to obscure the origin of funds, frequently involving intermediaries, shell companies, trade-based mechanisms, or cross-border transfers. Integration occurs when laundered funds are reintroduced into the legitimate economy through investments in real estate, companies, vehicles, precious metals, or financial instruments.

Turkish practice demonstrates that not all laundering schemes follow this classical sequence. In some cases, placement and integration may overlap, particularly where proceeds are generated in non-cash form or where criminal actors already operate within the formal economy. The flexibility of laundering techniques poses significant challenges for law enforcement and supervisors, requiring adaptive investigative strategies and continuous updating of regulatory controls.

Money laundering is intrinsically linked to a predicate offence and cannot exist independently of prior criminal conduct. Under Turkish law, laundering is treated as a derivative offence, but the scope of predicate offences is deliberately broad. In practice, predicate offences frequently include corruption-related crimes, organized crime activities, drug trafficking, customs and smuggling offences, fraud and aggravated fraud, cyber-enabled crimes, and illegal betting and gambling. Illegal betting has emerged as a particularly significant source of illicit proceeds in Türkiye, often involving transnational networks and digital payment systems that complicate detection and asset tracing.

The laundering techniques encountered in Türkiye-related cases are diverse and increasingly sophisticated. Cash remains a central vector, particularly in sectors such as hospitality, retail, construction, and transportation. Front companies and nominee arrangements are commonly used to disguise beneficial ownership. Trade-based money laundering, including over- and under-invoicing and false descriptions of goods or services, exploits Türkiye’s role as a trading hub. Real estate transactions, particularly in major cities and tourist regions, have long been identified as a high-risk area. Precious metals and stones, especially gold, play a distinctive role due to cultural, economic, and historical factors. In recent years, virtual assets and payment intermediaries have added new layers of complexity, enabling rapid movement of funds across borders and increasing anonymity when combined with layering techniques.

Combating money laundering in Türkiye is therefore inherently complex. Laundering methods evolve rapidly and often exploit regulatory gaps, uneven supervision, and coordination challenges among institutions. Investigators face evidentiary difficulties in proving the existence of a predicate offence or establishing the requisite intent for laundering. Beneficial ownership opacity and nominee structures impede attribution. Resource constraints and competing enforcement priorities affect investigative depth. Cross-border cooperation, while legally available, may be delayed by procedural requirements and differing legal standards. These challenges underscore the need for strong inter-agency coordination, effective financial intelligence, and a risk-based approach to supervision and enforcement.

Rationale for criminalizing money laundering and AML controls in Türkiye

The criminalization of money laundering serves multiple functions within the Turkish legal system. At a fundamental level, it enables authorities to target the economic foundations of crime by following financial flows rather than focusing exclusively on underlying criminal acts. From an enforcement perspective, laundering offences may operate as alternative charges where proving the predicate offence is difficult, as complementary charges alongside the predicate offence, or as standalone offences targeting professional facilitators who provide laundering services without directly committing the underlying crime.

Money laundering offences also play a crucial role in extending jurisdictional reach. Turkish law allows prosecution where laundering activities occur within Türkiye, even if the predicate offence was committed abroad, provided that the proceeds are transferred into or integrated within the Turkish financial or economic system. This approach reflects international standards and is particularly relevant in cases involving foreign corruption, cross-border fraud, or transnational organized crime.

Beyond criminalization, AML controls serve broader policy objectives. As a regional commercial and financial hub, Türkiye faces heightened risks associated with organized crime, terrorism financing, and illicit financial flows. Preventive AML measures are designed to protect the integrity of the financial system, maintain market confidence, and prevent Türkiye from becoming a conduit for international illicit finance. Following global developments after 2001, Turkish AML controls expanded to encompass terrorism financing and proliferation-related risks, leading to a more comprehensive and integrated regulatory framework.

AML controls are also indispensable for asset recovery. Customer due diligence, record-keeping, and reporting obligations generate the evidentiary trails necessary to identify and secure criminal proceeds. The effectiveness of asset recovery depends on the ability of domestic authorities to act swiftly and to cooperate with foreign counterparts when assets are moved across borders. Financial intelligence, particularly the analysis of suspicious transaction reports submitted to MASAK, often provides the initial trigger for investigations and provisional measures.

Development of international cooperation against money laundering and terrorist financing

The evolution of the international AML/CFT regime has profoundly influenced Türkiye’s domestic framework. Initial efforts focused on domestic administrative measures and drug-related offences, but by the late 1980s money laundering had been criminalized as a distinct offence in many jurisdictions. The subsequent institutionalization of global standard-setting through the Financial Action Task Force and the expansion of treaty-based cooperation marked a new phase, emphasizing not only legal rules but also effectiveness and implementation.

Türkiye incorporated these developments through legislative reforms, institutional strengthening, and engagement with international monitoring mechanisms. United Nations conventions influenced Turkish approaches to criminalization, confiscation, mutual legal assistance, and preventive controls. Over time, the concept of predicate offences expanded beyond narcotics, and international law increasingly emphasized comprehensive preventive frameworks and operational cooperation mechanisms, including extradition, joint investigations, and FIU-to-FIU information exchange.

The post-9/11 period intensified regulatory expectations, particularly regarding terrorism financing. Türkiye integrated counter-terrorism financing measures into its AML regime, expanding the scope of obliged entities, strengthening monitoring requirements, and adopting risk-based approaches to supervision. These developments reinforced the convergence between international standards and domestic practice, while also increasing compliance burdens for both public authorities and private actors.

FATF standards and preventive controls in Türkiye

FATF standards constitute the primary global benchmark for AML/CFT systems. Although formally non-binding, they exert significant practical influence through mutual evaluations, reputational effects, and their impact on market access and correspondent banking relationships. FATF recommendations address policy coordination, criminalization and confiscation, preventive measures, beneficial ownership transparency, powers of competent authorities, and international cooperation.

For Türkiye, alignment with FATF standards has required continuous adaptation of domestic legislation and practice. The operational focus has increasingly shifted toward effectiveness, encompassing the quality of national and sectoral risk assessments, the consistency of supervision across obliged entities, the volume and quality of suspicious transaction reporting, and the conversion of intelligence into investigations and prosecutions. Beneficial ownership transparency remains a central concern, as opaque ownership structures undermine investigative capacity. The ability to freeze, seize, and confiscate assets in a timely manner, particularly in cross-border cases, is also a key indicator of effectiveness.

Relevant treaties and regional instruments

Türkiye’s AML/CFT framework is underpinned by a range of international instruments that require criminalization, confiscation, and cooperation. United Nations conventions impose obligations to criminalize money laundering, facilitate asset recovery, and provide mutual legal assistance. Regional conventions complement these obligations by offering procedural tools for tracing, freezing, seizing, and confiscating criminal proceeds, including in terrorism financing cases.

These instruments interact with Turkish criminal procedure law and administrative regulations. Their practical value depends not only on formal ratification but also on the efficiency of domestic procedures and the willingness of authorities to engage in active cooperation. Delays in mutual legal assistance or difficulties in meeting evidentiary requirements can significantly affect outcomes in complex financial investigations.

International bodies, financial institutions, and cooperation networks

International bodies and financial institutions reinforce AML/CFT standards by embedding them into broader security and financial integrity agendas. For Türkiye, AML/CFT performance is therefore not merely a criminal justice matter but a determinant of financial system credibility, investment attractiveness, and international economic relations. Assessments by international bodies influence perceptions of risk and can have tangible consequences for cross-border financial activity.

Cooperation among financial intelligence units and operational networks is particularly important in Türkiye-linked cases, which often involve transactions and assets spanning multiple jurisdictions. FIU-to-FIU exchanges enable early tracing and intelligence sharing, while formal mutual legal assistance remains essential for obtaining admissible evidence and enforcing judicial measures.

Outlook and Assessment

The global AML/CFT regime has driven substantial legal and institutional reform in Türkiye, embedding “follow the money” strategies at the core of efforts to combat organized crime, corruption, and terrorism financing. Türkiye has developed a comprehensive legal framework that combines criminalization, preventive regulation, and international cooperation mechanisms. Nevertheless, persistent challenges remain. Beneficial ownership opacity, rapidly evolving laundering methods, uneven supervisory capacity across sectors, and delays in cross-border cooperation continue to test the effectiveness of the system.

Effectiveness questions are particularly acute where AML/CFT controls rely heavily on private-sector gatekeepers. Risk assessments, due diligence, and reporting obligations impose significant responsibilities on obliged entities, and the legitimacy of the regime depends on demonstrable enforcement outcomes and proportionate supervision. Resource allocation, institutional coordination, and prioritization are critical in ensuring that compliance burdens translate into tangible crime-control benefits.

Unintended consequences must also be considered. De-risking and de-banking practices may undermine financial inclusion, while extensive surveillance and reporting obligations raise privacy and data protection concerns. Freezing and confiscation measures must be implemented with due regard to procedural safeguards and fair trial rights. The future success of Türkiye’s AML/CFT posture will depend on strengthening transparency, accelerating cooperation, enhancing supervisory consistency, and continuously adapting to new laundering typologies, while safeguarding fundamental rights and maintaining the legitimacy of the legal system.

© 2025 Prof. Dr. Vahit Bıçak / Bıçak Law Firm – All rights reserved. This article was written by Prof. Dr. Vahit Bıçak for publication on the website www.bicakhukuk.com. Even if cited as a source, the full text of the article may not be used without prior permission. However, a portion of the article may be quoted, provided that an active link is included. Publishing the article in whole or in part without indicating the author and the source constitutes a violation of personal and intellectual property rights.

Reference: Bıçak Vahit (2025) “Money Laundering in Türkiye: Legal Framework, Rules, and Practice”, Bıçak Law Firm Blog, https://www.bicakhukuk.com/en/money-laundering-in-turkiye-legal-rules-and-practice/, p. __., Access Date: ….