Corruption is widely regarded as a highly damaging phenomenon that states and non-state actors ought to combat. In Türkiye, as elsewhere, corruption undermines the rule of law and good governance, distorts markets, weakens public trust, obstructs sustainable development, and can enable organized crime and illicit financial flows to flourish. Although “corruption” lacks a single, universally agreed legal definition, it is commonly understood as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain, or the exercise of improper influence over those entrusted with power (Nye (1967); Mungiu-Pippidi (2015); Bukovansky (2006); Rose (2015)). International law has imbued specific corrupt acts with treaty-based definitions that both reflect and shape domestic law. In Türkiye, the fight against corruption is not predominantly “international” in day-to-day practice; most enforcement and prevention efforts play out at the domestic level – through criminal justice, administrative integrity systems, procurement and audit mechanisms, and financial-crime compliance. Still, international instruments have significantly catalysed and shaped Türkiye’s anti-corruption framework – especially through criminalization expectations, mutual legal assistance, and peer review dynamics.

International legal instruments primarily adopt a criminal law approach to corruption, placing a large portion of international anti-corruption law within transnational criminal law. Türkiye’s treaty participation sits squarely within this pattern: Türkiye is a party to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) (ratified in November 2006) and to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (instrument deposited in July 2000). Türkiye is also embedded in Council of Europe anti-corruption monitoring through GRECO (member since 1 January 2004). Alongside binding treaties, Türkiye’s anti-corruption landscape is influenced by non-binding instruments (guidelines, recommendations, “best practices”), including those connected to OECD foreign bribery monitoring and FATF-style anti-money laundering standards, which shape compliance expectations and domestic implementation strategies. 

International legal approaches to corruption relevant to Türkiye extend beyond criminal-law treaties. Corruption interacts with (i) human rights law – where corruption may undermine access to services, fair trial safeguards, and protection of journalists/whistleblowers; (ii) international investment arbitration – where corruption allegations can operate as a jurisdictional or admissibility barrier; and (iii) sanctions and debarment regimes – where development banks and states may impose targeted measures in response to serious corruption. Türkiye, as an investment-host and a participant in cross-border finance and trade, is therefore affected by multiple international legal “channels” of anti-corruption beyond core criminalization.

History

Early international norm-building (1975–1980) and why it mattered later for Türkiye

In the 1970s, corruption entered the agenda of international organizations through scandals linked to multinational corporate misconduct and illicit payments abroad. These debates produced competing views about the scope of “corrupt conduct” and the proper legal response – ranging from broad approaches (including improper political financing and corporate influence) to narrower treaty models focused mainly on bribery. While Türkiye was not the central driver of these early debates, their legacy mattered: when international treaty-making returned strongly in the 1990s, the narrower, criminalization-centered approach largely prevailed, shaping the architecture that Türkiye later joined.

The failure of a universal UN treaty on illicit payments in that era did not end norm development. Instead, soft-law instruments emerged (notably within the OECD context), laying groundwork for later binding obligations and the eventual globalization of foreign bribery norms – norms that would become especially salient for Türkiye as its outbound trade, contracting, and corporate internationalization expanded.

The cascade of treaties (1996–2010) and Türkiye’s integration into the regime

From the mid-1990s onward, treaty-making accelerated at regional and global levels (OAS, EU/COE, AU, and ultimately the UN). For Türkiye, three institutional “anchors” became particularly significant:

• OECD foreign bribery framework: Türkiye joined the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention system early, and its implementation has been subject to periodic country monitoring. 
• Council of Europe integrity framework (GRECO): Türkiye has been evaluated through successive GRECO rounds, including integrity and prevention themes for top executive functions and law enforcement.
• UNCAC: Türkiye became a party to UNCAC in 2006, connecting Türkiye to the universal treaty platform and to UNCAC’s cooperation and prevention chapters.

UNCAC’s near-universal participation makes it the central global treaty reference point. For Türkiye, UNCAC is important not only for the substantive template it provides (criminalization options plus prevention measures), but also as a basis for international cooperation when no specialized bilateral treaty is available – particularly in mutual legal assistance and asset tracing contexts.

Fundamental aspects of the anti-corruption treaty regime

Criminalization of corruption offences 

Anti-corruption treaties largely adopt a criminal law approach: they require states to criminalize specified conduct domestically and to enforce those laws. In Türkiye, the domestic “entry point” is therefore not direct treaty criminal responsibility, but Turkish criminal legislation and related enforcement practice, with treaties operating as harmonization drivers and cooperation frameworks.

International treaties generally focus on bribery and embezzlement/misappropriation, and – more optionally – trading in influence, abuse of functions, and illicit enrichment. Türkiye’s domestic framework reflects this general architecture through criminal offences and complementary integrity/asset declaration mechanisms, though the precise alignment varies by offence category and by whether the treaty obligation is mandatory or “consider” (non-mandatory).

Bribery is a core treaty offence. In Türkiye, bribery is anchored in Turkish Criminal Code (TCC) Article 252, which criminalizes the securing of an undue advantage for a public official (or another indicated person) to perform or not perform an act related to duty, with corresponding liability for both sides of the transaction. Treaties and commentary often describe “active” and “passive” bribery; regardless of labels, the essential exchange of an undue advantage to influence official conduct is central.

Treaties differ on recipient scope. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention focuses on active bribery of foreign public officials in international business. Türkiye’s implementation path explicitly addressed foreign bribery within its domestic framework (including references to the bribery of foreign public officials as a legislative focus for OECD compliance). 

Embezzlement/misappropriation provisions in treaties typically cover the diversion of property by someone entrusted with it by virtue of office or function. Türkiye’s domestic law addresses analogous conduct through offences dealing with misappropriation of entrusted property by public officials and related crimes; in practice, these provisions often intersect with public procurement and audit findings, and with financial investigations where proceeds are laundered.

Trading in influence / abuse of functions / illicit enrichment: UNCAC treats these as non-mandatory (states must “consider” criminalization). This design matters for Türkiye because implementation choices may differ: some conduct is addressed via criminal offences; some via administrative ethics rules; some via asset declaration/disciplinary mechanisms. Functionally, these tools often operate as “evidentiary bridges” when classic bribery proof is difficult.

Money laundering link: treaties (including UNCAC) commonly tie corruption to money laundering controls, because laundering is the typical mechanism used to hide corrupt proceeds. Türkiye’s anti-money laundering architecture (including financial intelligence and compliance obligations) therefore becomes a practical component of anti-corruption effectiveness, particularly for tracing, freezing, and confiscation.

Domestic Enforcement 

Most treaties create relatively few detailed obligations about how prosecutors must exercise discretion, how immunities must be handled, or how investigative priorities must be set. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is an important exception through its rule that prosecution decisions should not be influenced by national economic interest or diplomatic considerations (a principle that OECD monitoring systems emphasize). Türkiye’s OECD monitoring cycle and public reporting landscape are therefore practically important to assessing implementation beyond black-letter law. 

A modern enforcement reality also relevant to Türkiye is the growing role of negotiated or non-trial resolutions in some jurisdictions (especially for foreign bribery cases internationally). Even where domestic procedure differs, Türkiye-based corporate compliance increasingly must account for cross-border enforcement risk – because investigations and resolutions may occur abroad while facts and actors are connected to Türkiye.

International Cooperation 

For Türkiye, international cooperation provisions are often among the most operationally significant parts of UNCAC and related instruments – because corruption, procurement, contracting chains, and the concealment of proceeds frequently cross borders.

UNCAC’s mutual legal assistance article is famously detailed and can function as a “mini-treaty” on cooperation. The treaty can provide a legal basis for assistance where a bilateral MLA or extradition treaty is missing, including for evidence sharing, freezing/seizing, and confiscation-related measures. Türkiye’s status as a UNCAC State Party therefore matters not only substantively, but also procedurally for cross-border investigations and asset recovery.

Asset recovery is a special emphasis of UNCAC, including preventive detection, restraint (freezing/seizure), confiscation, and return. For Türkiye, this chapter is particularly relevant in cases involving transnational placement of assets (real estate, accounts, shell companies), and in cooperative efforts where ownership claims, confiscation orders, and return mechanisms become central.

Prevention 

Most treaties are criminal-law heavy, but UNCAC devotes an entire chapter to prevention and integrity, requiring anti-corruption policies to reflect principles such as rule of law, integrity, transparency, and accountability. While these provisions can be broadly phrased, they have practical impact: they legitimize and encourage domestic integrity infrastructures – public procurement safeguards, codes of conduct, conflict-of-interest controls, and asset/interest declarations.

For Türkiye, prevention is particularly salient in public procurement and public finance management, where corruption risk is structurally concentrated. Integrity rules for senior officials, conflict-of-interest restrictions, and disclosure systems are also key. GRECO’s evaluation rounds for Türkiye explicitly examine prevention and integrity themes (including conflicts of interest and asset declarations) for top executive functions and law enforcement.

Beneficial ownership transparency has become a major preventive tool globally. International standards emphasize identifying the natural persons who ultimately own/control legal entities. Debates about public access versus controlled access (for financial institutions, journalists, and civil society) show how prevention tools raise privacy and due process questions – issues that are equally relevant when designing or evaluating Türkiye’s transparency mechanisms.

Anti-corruption Institutions 

International anti-corruption governance is decentralized: UNODC (UNCAC), OECD monitoring, COE/GRECO evaluations, development banks’ sanctions systems, and civil society all shape norms and expectations. For Türkiye, this produces layered external review and benchmarking – especially through OECD country monitoring on foreign bribery OECD and GRECO evaluation rounds.

Yet enforcement remains primarily domestic: prosecutors, investigators, judges, administrative inspectors, auditors, and sector regulators are the practical engines. The effectiveness question in Türkiye – like elsewhere – is therefore not just “what is the law?”, but “how do institutions coordinate, prioritize, investigate complex financial trails, and ensure credible accountability while respecting due process?”

Peer review matters. It generates data, recommendations, and external pressure that can shape reforms, compliance programs, and institutional design. In Türkiye’s case, GRECO and OECD processes provide structured lenses for evaluating prevention measures, legal definitions, institutional independence, and enforcement track record.

Relationship between Corruption and Human Rights

Corruption can violate human rights directly (petty corruption blocking access to services) or negatively impact rights indirectly (grand corruption degrading health, education, housing, or disaster-response capacity). Corruption may also be associated with threats to journalists, whistleblowers, prosecutors, and judges. Conversely, anti-corruption measures can trigger rights concerns – privacy, property, and fair trial protections – especially in asset freezing, confiscation, and targeted sanctions contexts.

For Türkiye, this relationship is legally and practically important: anti-corruption policy must be designed and implemented in ways that strengthen accountability while maintaining procedural safeguards, evidence standards, and judicial guarantees.

Corruption and International Economic Law 

Corruption increasingly appears in investor-state arbitration practice as a defence (illegality, jurisdiction, admissibility) and as a factual background to disputes. For Türkiye, this matters for two reasons: (i) corruption allegations can defeat investor claims without necessarily producing domestic accountability for implicated officials; and (ii) such allegations raise complex evidentiary questions that can influence both arbitration strategy and domestic investigative follow-up.

Arbitration practice highlights persistent proof challenges – often relying on circumstantial evidence, intermediary structures, and adverse inferences. These dynamics are relevant to Türkiye-based disputes where procurement chains, consultancy payments, intermediaries, and offshore structures may be alleged.

Anti-corruption Sanctions 

Beyond criminal law, development banks and states use sanctions/debarment regimes for corruption. The World Bank sanctions system (and cross-debarment) can exclude firms from financed projects, while “Magnitsky-style” targeted sanctions can freeze assets and restrict entry for those linked to serious corruption or human rights abuses.

Even when Türkiye is not the sanctioning authority, Türkiye-linked individuals and companies can face extraterritorial exposure (through counterparties, banking channels, or projects financed/regulated abroad). These regimes raise due process concerns (low proof standards, delisting procedures) and create compliance incentives that reshape corporate behaviour and risk management.

Assessment 

International anti-corruption law is relatively young, and its modern architecture – narrowly centred on bribery and embezzlement, plus variants like trading in influence and illicit enrichment – has deeply influenced domestic systems, including Türkiye’s. Türkiye’s participation in the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, GRECO, and UNCAC places it firmly within the main treaty-driven enforcement and peer review ecosystem.

The key empirical question for Türkiye – mirroring the global debate – is impact in practice: how consistently do enforcement bodies pursue complex corruption cases, how effectively do they use international cooperation tools (MLA, extradition, asset restraint and recovery), and how strongly do integrity systems (procurement, conflicts of interest, asset declarations, beneficial ownership transparency) prevent corruption before it occurs?

Prevention tools are a frontier. UNCAC’s prevention chapter – though often broad – legitimizes the shift toward systems-based governance: integrity rules for senior officials, public procurement safeguards, disclosure regimes, and financial transparency mechanisms. GRECO’s integrity-focused evaluation themes for Türkiye reflect this preventive turn. 

Finally, Türkiye-facing practice must integrate multiple legal “tracks”: domestic criminal law (including bribery under TCC Article 252) cross-border cooperation under UNCAC, corporate compliance shaped by OECD foreign bribery monitoring, and the broader ecosystem of sanctions, debarment, and investment arbitration. The most durable advances in Türkiye’s anti-corruption effectiveness are likely to come from the interaction of these tracks: credible enforcement, practical cooperation capacity, and prevention systems that reduce opportunity structures for corruption while preserving due process.

© 2025 Prof. Dr. Vahit Bıçak / Bıçak Law Firm – All rights reserved. This article was written by Prof. Dr. Vahit Bıçak for publication on the website www.bicakhukuk.com. Even if cited as a source, the full text of the article may not be used without prior permission. However, a portion of the article may be quoted, provided that an active link is included. Publishing the article in whole or in part without indicating the author and the source constitutes a violation of personal and intellectual property rights.

Reference: Bıçak Vahit (2025) “Türkiye and International Anti-Corruption Law”, Bıçak Law Firm Blog, https://www.bicakhukuk.com/en/untoc-implementation-in-turkiye-law-and-practice/, p. __., Access Date: ….